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Abstract.  In 1999, the city of Bogotá, Colombia launched the Concession School program designed to 
broaden the coverage and quality of basic education. It consists of a contract between a group of private 
schools and the public educational system such that private agents provide education for low-income 
students.  This paper tests three main hypotheses concerning the impact of concessions on the quality of 
education: first, dropout rates are lower in concession schools than in similar public schools; second, 
other public schools nearby the concession schools have lower dropout rates in comparison with other 
public schools outside the area of influence; third, test scores from concession schools are higher than 
scores in similar public schools. The paper presents evidence in favor of the three hypotheses, using 
propensity score and matching estimators. 
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1.  Introduction: The Concession Schools Program 
 
In 1999, the city of Bogotá, Colombia launched an educational program designed to broaden the 
coverage and quality of basic education. The program, called Concession Schools, is a 
partnership between the public and private education sectors, with private schools providing 
public education in 25 schools for a period of 15 years. The state provides the infrastructure, 
selects the students and pays a pre-agreed sum per full-time student per year (approximately 
$1,200,000 Colombian pesos (US $520), according to Villa and Duarte, 2002), which is higher 
than what most regular public schools receive (approximately Col $1,000,000, or US $430).  The 
concession schools must provide education to the population assigned to them by the state, but 
they are allowed relative flexibility to contract administrative and teaching staff and can freely 
implement their pedagogic model.  The concession schools must also meet performance 
standards (on quality and quantity) set by the Secretary of Education.  For instance, each school 
commits to surpass the mean score of standardized tests in similar schools.  
 
Over 25,000 students participate in the concessions program, representing close to 3 percent of 
the total public enrollment in the city (World Bank 2005).  The schools were built following two 
main criteria.  First, they were located in extremely poor areas of the city.  Second, they were 
built in areas where the demand for primary and secondary education was higher than the 
number of places supplied by city public schools.  Any student from the affected neighborhood 
can apply for enrollment in the concession schools.  The Secretary of Education of the District 
uses means testing to allocate places in the concession schools among the applicants.  The 
students not accepted into the concession schools are placed into nearby public schools.  
 
During 2004 and 2005, a team from the World Bank visited several schools in the public system, 
including two regular public schools, one private school that receives public students and three 
concession schools.  During the visits and conversations with headmasters, teachers and students, 
it became clear that the differences across the three types of schools were very sharp.  In contrast 
to regular public schools, concession schools had very good infrastructure, similar to good 
private schools.  Also, the relationship between teachers and students in the concession schools   3
was open and very constructive.  Finally, the concession school students were very proud of their 
schools.  
 
Concession schools are located in areas ranking at the lowest tail of the income distribution. 
Children in these zones in general face several problems, including lack of affection and other 
family problems, as well as poor nutrition. According to interviews with different headmasters, 
concessions, in their objective to provide high quality education, are providing psychological 
counseling and an environment of affection to students.  Daily psychological counseling is 
offered to several students.  Children that are suspected of having family problems are subject to 
home visits by social workers and psychologists from the school.  Children that miss classes 
regularly are subject to home visits as well.  To counter poor nutrition, several concession 
schools have their own food program, which complements the public program.  The regular 
public school food program consists mainly of fruit, a piece of cake and a yogurt or a juice. 
Some concessions add a complete lunch, which generally includes a protein.  
 
Another clear objective of the concession schools is to work with the communities in which they 
operate.  Several of them have an open door policy during weekends, and they encourage 
teacher-parent meetings on a regular basis.  They work with the community through programs to 
resolve family problems and provide adult education. Finally, for many of the headmasters, the 
academic impact of the concession schools was considered a byproduct of the other measures: 
they need to provide psychological and nutritional balance to students before they can address 
academic achievement. 
 
Clearly, family problems and poor nutrition are also plague students in regular public schools. 
However, those schools do not have the resources to implement the strategies that concession 
schools use.  In fact, non-concession public schools do not often have the resources to maintain 
what minimal infrastructure they have.  For example, in both of the public schools that the World 
Bank team visited the bathroom facilities were limited and they were out of service on some 
days. 
   4
Despite the apparently good reputation of concession schools, in 2005 the program was under 
debate.  Some members of Bogotá’s City Council claimed that the program did not yield the 
expected results because the average standardized test scores were lower than the average scores 
for regular public schools.  However, as discussed below, though the test scores for concession 
schools were lower according to a general comparison of means, in fact once confounding 
variables are controlled for, it appears that the concession schools do have a positive impact. 
 
The qualitative evidence compiled during the visits to the concession schools and the public 
debate in the Council induced three main hypotheses that are the subject of this paper: 
 
a.  Dropout rates are lower in concession schools than in similar public schools.  The 
dropout rate is another measure of schooling and, presumably, it responds quicker to 
interventions than do test scores.  Through the various interventions described above, 
concession schools attempt to keep children in school.   
b.  Regular public schools near the concession schools have lower dropout rates than 
public schools outside the influence of concessions.  Concession schools have had 
positive externalities, through their community work, on nearby public schools.  In 
addition, increased competition in the educational market due to the existence of 
concession schools has caused improvements in nearby schools.  Previous literature 
on school choice (Hoxby 2002) supports this hypothesis.    
c.  Concession school test scores are at least equal to or higher than test scores for 
regular public schools. Measuring the impact of any program on test scores can be 
complicated and theoretically we should observe changes in the schools after long-
term exposure to the program. Given the recent implementation of the program, the 
most any student has attended a concession school is six years, and their early years 
were spent in regular public schools.  
 
Section 2 of this paper discusses methodological issues, underlining the reasons that concession 
schools may produce better educational outcomes than regular public schools.  Section 3 outlines 
the empirical strategy, which is based on propensity score matching estimators.  Section 4   5
presents the results.  Section 5 finishes with conclusions and a discussion on the relationship 
between dropout rates and test scores.       
 
2.  Methodological issues and theoretical framework 
a.  General framework 
 
The basic equation for estimation is based on the idea that educational outcomes depend on a 
production function based on certain inputs (Hanushek 1986, 1996).  Specifically, the literature 
considers that a measure of educational attainment,  t j i Y , .  of individual  i  in school  j  in a given 
moment t, depends on the inputs of the school,   t j Z ,  and on the characteristics of the individual, 
t j X , , such that: 
 
                ) , , ( , , , , , t i t j t i t j i Z X f Y ε =                         (1) 
Included among the variables of school inputs,  t j Z , , are the student/teacher ratio, the educational 
attainment of the teachers, school infrastructure and school size.  The characteristics of the 
individuals,  t i X , , control for household income, the educational level of the parents, the number 
of siblings, etcetera.  In Equation (1),  t i, ε  captures the unobservable characteristics of the 
individual, such as ability, skills and motivation that may influence test scores but cannot be 
measured.  The dependent variables,  t j i Y , , , are the standardized test scores and the dropout rate. 
 
Equation (1) depends on several premises: 
•  The quantity and quality of the school inputs are fundamental in the production of better 
education, be they measured by higher standardized test scores or lower dropout rates.  
•  The characteristics of the individuals are also critical elements in the production of better 
education. Individuals with better skills, better nutrition and with an adequate home 
environment should also perform better in school. 
•  These two groups of characteristics (school and individual/family) interact to yield the 
third fundamental component in the education production function.  
   6
In a meta-analysis of Equation (1) Hanushek (1996) reaches several conclusions.  First, there is 
no clear relationship between several of the school inputs and the quality of education.  The 
pupil/teacher ratio, for example, may have a concave relationship with the outcome measures.   
A small number of pupils in the classroom may inhibit participation and it is possible that the 
positive externalities of participation do not occur.  A large class size may also inhibit 
participation and may produce negative externalities such as noise.  Second, the quality of the 
teacher is a key element in the production of education. And third, the role of the family is 
equally important as the quality of the teacher. 
 
The impact of the concession program on the quality of education can be explained through 
several channels (for a general discussion, see World Bank 2005).  First, private participation 
assumes the application of an already proven pedagogic model since the private schools have 
already been operating for some time.  Concession schools were, in fact, handed over to private 
schools with the highest standardized test scores.  Likewise, concession schools are financially 
stable since the State pays a fixed sum per student, ensuring the stability of the pedagogic model.  
 
Second, the freedom to choose the teaching and administrative staff may lead to a better quality 
of education than in the public schools where the teachers’ union makes it difficult to implement 
staff changes (for instance, see Borgas and Acosta 2005; Duarte 1996).  Third, concession 
schools have contracts that establish goals in terms of standardized test.  Fourth, the 
infrastructure of these schools is superior to that of public schools providing the students better 
learning opportunities.  Concession schools were, in fact, built on better lots than were the 
average public school, with better equipment and a complete set of supplies for classrooms, 
laboratories and libraries. 
 
Finally, concession schools in general work actively with the pupils’ parents and the surrounding 
communities.  The community work has been one of the more discussed factors in visits to 
several concession schools: school officials, pupils, parents and other community members alike 
identify this community work as one the most important features of the initiative. 
 
b.  Some empirical evidence   7
 
In the case of Colombia, Gaviria and Barrientos (2001), Barrera (2003) and Sarmiento and others 
(2004) have estimated Equation (1).  These studies reach similar conclusions as Hanushek 
(1996).  They show that school quality variables, such as the educational level of the teachers, 
tend to have a positive impact on standardized test scores.  Also, they corroborate the importance 
of individual characteristics.   
 
Early articles about concessions focused on the description of the experience. Corpoeducación 
(2004) and Villa and Duarte (2002) describe the concession school initiative in great detail. 
Rodriguez (2005) presents an overview of the concession schools program, explaining the details 
of the program’s design and potential effects of the program. 
 
Sarmiento and others (2005) present an evaluation of concession schools. They follow a different 
methodology than the one used here. In short, they applied a very detailed questionnaire to 22 
concession schools and 10 public ones with similar characteristics. The questionnaire focused on 
internal processes and the educational production. Variables derived from the questionnaire were 
correlated with standardized test scores. They found that there are clear differences between the 
concession and pure public schools in terms of administration, autonomy of decisions, the 
capacity to adjust, and the impact on the community. Overall, they found that concession schools 
are performing better than the traditional public schools.   
 
Charter schools in the United States offer additional insight.  Despite the differences across states 
in the implementation of charter school programs in the United States, they are similar to the 
concession schools in that public education is delivered by independent entities, with some 
degree of autonomy and are generally targeted to low-income students 
(www.uscharterschools.org).  Solmon and Goldschmidt (2004) found positive impacts of charter 
schools on standardized test scores and other characteristics, such as the retention rate.
2  In 
contrast, Hanushek and others (2005) present evidence of a negative impact of this type of 
schools.  Hoxby and Rockoff (2004) present strong evidence in favor of charter schools, using 
the randomized character of Chicago’s charter school program to determine the impact of charter 
                                                 
2 Nelson and Hollenbeck (2001) present a critical view of Solmon and Goldschmidt.    8
schools on standardized test scores.
3  The randomized nature of the allocation process allowed 
them to create a treatment and a control group that have the same observable and unobservable 
characteristics.  They found that students who attended an average of two years in an elementary 
level charter school in Chicago scored higher on both math and reading tests. 
 
  
3.  Empirical strategy 
 
The basic methodology used to evaluate the impact of the program is to compare the group of 
individuals that were admitted to a concession school (treatment group) to the group of students 
who attend public school (comparison group) (see Heckman and others, 1999).  The correct 
evaluation of a program requires the establishment of a counterfactual for the treatment group; 
that is, what would have happened had the treated individual not been treated.  Of course, it is 
not possible to observe the same individual in the two states and it is therefore necessary to 
choose another individual, to serve as a comparison, who is as similar as possible, both in 
observable and unobservable characteristics, to the treated individual.  Simple comparisons of 
mean test scores (or dropout rates) between students in concession schools with students in other 
types of schools may be biased measures of the true impact because the two groups may be very 
different in their observable and unobservable characteristics.  
  
In mathematical terms,
4 let 
1 Y  denote the standardized test score (or the dropout rate) for 
individual i who received the treatment (attended concession school) and 
0 Y if the individual 
went to another school. Let 1 = T  denote the “treatment condition” for those who received 
treatment, and  0 = T  otherwise.  The impact of the program (IP) will be given by 
) 1 / ( ) 1 / (
0 1 = − = = T Y E T Y E IP , e.g., the mean test score of the same individual, with and 
without attending concession school.  It is not possible, however, to observe the same individual 
in both states.  What is observable are two different individuals, one attending a concession 
school and the other not,  ) 0 / ( ) 1 / (
0 1
~
= − = = T Y E T Y E IP .  
                                                 
3 In fact, when there exists excess demand for school places, the majority of States allocate students to the charter 
schools based on lotteries. 
4 The basic reference for the discussion of the problem is Heckman and others (1999).  This section is based on 
Chapter 2 in Vinha (2005), which presents a concise explanation of the problem.    9
  
This estimator can suffer from bias because of self-selection into the program. In short, the two 
types of individuals may differ systematically in observable and unobservable characteristics 
such that a typical control observation is not a good proxy of what would have happened to a 
treated individual had he not received the treatment.  In the case of the concession school, the 
two groups, for example, are not comparable in terms of income, thus leading to bias.  That is,  
) 0 / ( ) 1 / (
0 0 = ≠ = T Y E T Y E .  
 
Ideally, a program like concession schools can be evaluated using a simple randomization 
strategy: given that there exists excess demand for concession schools, the government can 
perform a lottery to allocate individuals between concessions and other public schools. The 
randomization would ensure that the group of students that attends a concession school 
(treatment group) and the one that attends other public schools (control group) are very similar in 
observables and unobservables characteristics. However, as discussed above, the school 
placements were not done by a lottery.  
 
A second approach
5 would be to take as a control group students who applied to a concession 
school but were assigned to another public school. Still, evaluations based on the comparison of 
these two groups may be prone to bias, mainly because the selection of students into concession 
and other public schools is not random. 
6    
 
In contrast, this paper uses the whole sample of individuals who attend public schools and uses 
matching estimators as the strategy to “reduce” selection bias. In short, the estimator will try to 
match each treated individual with an individual who does not attend a concession school, based 
on the observable characteristics of the individuals (a vector X).  In this way, the estimator can be 
modified by  ) 0 , / ( ) 1 , / (
0 1
~
= − = = T X Y E T X Y E IP . 
 
Moreover, instead of using the vector of characteristics x, it is possible to determine the 
probability of participation in the program (where T is equal to 1 or 0), such that 
                                                 
5 This approach was suggested by an anonymous referee.  
6 Moreover, the information on who applies to a concession school is not available to the public.    10
) ( ) / Pr( ) ( X f X T X P = = .  This probability is called the propensity score.  In other words, the 
propensity score captures in a synthetic form the intention to participate in a program, based on a 
broad vector of observable characteristics thought to influence the participation decision and the 
outcome measures.  For each individual (both in the treatment and the control group) a 
probability of participating in the program is estimated using the observable characteristics. 
 
Therefore, the following estimation is used to calculate the impact of the program:  
 
) 0 , ) ( / ( ) 1 , ) ( / (
~
0
~
1
~
= − = = T X P Y E T X P Y E IP          (2) 
 
Clearly, the endogeneity problem can arise due to either observable or unobservable 
characteristics.  Equation (2) controls for the observable characteristics, but not for the 
unobservable ones.   Heckman and others (1998, 1999) show that, in fact, the bias of estimation 
may come from three margins, and the most important one is the difference in the observable 
characteristics among individuals.  As stated previously, it is essential for rigorous impact 
evaluation that the control and treatment groups have, on average, similar characteristics.     
Besides differences in the average treatment and non-treated individual, there may be differences 
in the support of the populations.  For example, noneligible individuals cannot be part of the 
control group since there are no treatment observations with the characteristics of the noneligible 
individuals.  The third potential difference between the groups arises from potential differences 
in the unobservable characteristics.  According to the estimates of Heckman and others (1998), 
once the observable characteristics are similar between groups, and the observations fall within 
the same support the bias due to unobservable characteristics is relatively small. 
 
The evaluation of the concessions program in Bogota may suffer from self-selection into the 
program from two sources.  First, the location of the schools was not randomly chosen.   
Authorities built the concessions in areas where there was a high concentration of low-income 
individuals and a scarce supply of public education.  Second, an unknown proportion of the 
students are not randomly assigned to the schools.  Individuals, when applying to public 
education, can state their preferred school in their neighborhood.  As discussed above, the paper 
copes with the problem of endogeneity by using propensity scores and matching estimators.  In   11
this way, I “minimize” the endogeneity problem and can obtain estimates that approximate the 
impact of the program. In any case, the predicted bias of the estimation is downwards since the 
pool of individuals that attend concessions comes from extremely poor areas.  
 
The paper presents direct and indirect impacts of the concession schools.  In order to estimates 
these impacts, the paper separates the public schools into three categories: (i) concession schools, 
(ii) regular public schools close to the concession schools (that is, within the influence of a 
concession school) and (iii) public schools outside of the influence of the concession schools.  
The difference between students in concession schools and the matched students who go to 
public schools outside the influence of concession schools is the measure of direct impact.  In 
contrast, the indirect impact of concession schools is measures as the difference between the 
students in public schools nearby the concession school and the students in similar schools 
outside the area of influence of the concessions.  The area of influence is defined as being within 
one kilometer of a concession school.  Given that some concessions are going to have more than 
one regular public school within this definition of proximity, we also rank the proximity among 
the nearby schools. 
7 
 
The indirect impact is governed conceptually by the idea that nearby schools may be forced to 
raise the quality of education to compete with concession schools, as well as respond to 
community pressure. This idea is similar to the argument that vouchers will increase the quality 
of education due to market and choice forces, as outlined by Friedman (1955).  Recent literature 
finds evidence in favor of this type of mechanism.  For instance, Hoxby (2002) shows that 
competition and choice (in the form of vouchers and charter schools) increase productivity of 
public schools significantly.  In the case of Bogota, not only do the concession schools impact 
the nearby public schools through community outreach but they also encourage better 
performance by regular pubic schools due to the competition for resources.  Since 2002, the 
central government has transferred educational resources to the localities based on the number of 
students enrolled in school.  Presumably, concessions attract students away from the regular 
public school system, and the great the difference in quality between regular and concession 
                                                 
7 One area of future research will be to test for robustness of the results using another radius for the area of 
influence.   12
schools, the greater the effect.   In order to guarantee greater resources, the nearby public schools 
need to match the performance of the concession schools. 
 
To estimate the indirect impact of the program, I use a two-step process.  I first identify the 
baseline.  Given the identification of nearby schools as discussed above, I match them based on 
their common characteristics with similar schools outside the influence area in 1999.  As stated 
before, concession schools started in 1999 were fully operational by 2000.  These control schools 
are determined using propensity scores.  Second, using data for 2003, I estimate the indirect 
impact using those students who attended schools close to a concession school as treated 
individuals, and those students who attended the matched schools found in the previous step as 
the control group.  
 
The baseline data can be used to control for differences in initial characteristics.  However, 
another problem that may persist is the difference in pre-existing trends between the treated 
schools and the matched schools.  Unfortunately, data prior to 1999 does not exist to test for this 
possibility.  However, a priori, there is no theoretical ground to believe that there exist systematic 
differences in trends between schools under the influence of concessions and schools outside the 
area of influence of concessions.  
 
In short, the estimation that I present below is based on matching estimators using propensity 
scores to determine the treatment and control groups. The estimation will present evidence of 
“direct impact” (dropout rates and test scores for concession versus matched non-concession 
public schools outside the area of influence) and “indirect impact” (dropout rates for schools near 
the concession against matched schools outside the area of influence of concessions).   
 
4.  Data and Results 
 
a.  Description of the data 
 
The paper uses data from two sources  the Ministry of Education (surveys C600 and C100) and 
Institute for the Development of Higher Education (Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de la   13
Educación Superior ICFES), which administers standardized tests in Colombia.  The C600 and 
the C100 surveys provide general data on an important array of school characteristics and have 
an identification code that allows researchers to link these datasets with the ICFES test scores.  
The Ministry of Education collects the data directly via a questionnaire to all the schools in the 
country.  Data are at the school and “schedule” level.  
 
The school level data present information on the number of administrative personnel, the number 
and level of education of teachers, the number of teachers by subject areas, the number of 
physicians in the school, the total number of students in the school by grade and by age, the 
number of students who failed a grade and the number of students who dropped out.  These data 
are available for both 1999 and 2003. 
 
For 1999, there is also information on the physical characteristics of schools.  The main variables 
are: furniture in the school (chairs and desks), support materials such as computers, the number 
of computers exclusively for teaching purposes, the total number of laboratories, the number of 
laboratories for specific subjects (physics, chemistry, biology, construction and farming), the 
total number of rooms, the number of classrooms, the number of libraries, the number of food 
facilities and dorms, the number of other types of rooms and the number of sports facilities 
(soccer fields and basketball courts). 
 
The surveys also breakdown the data at the schedule level, the time at which the school offers 
services.  There are four main schedules during which students can attend school: in the morning 
(usually from 7:00 am to 12:00 pm), in the afternoon (from 12:00 pm to 4:00 pm), in the evening 
(from 2:00 pm to 7:00 pm); or they can attend a school with a “complete” schedule (from 8:00 
am to 3:00 pm).  The schedule mechanism was implemented throughout the country in the 1960s 
to maximize the use of school infrastructure.  In this way, some schools that previously operated 
only during the morning were subsequently open for two schedules (e.g., morning and 
afternoon), thus allowing them to enroll twice the number of students.  It is important to note that 
the data discriminate between the two schedules as if they were two different schools.  
 
   14
Second, data from ICFES provide test scores for individuals and some student characteristics.  
The test scores used here are those for a general test that is administered to all students who are 
finishing their secondary education.  Although the ICFES data provides test scores for various 
subjects, the analysis here focuses on mathematics and reading scores.  Student characteristics, 
such as gender and current enrollment status are also provided.  Other variables linked to the 
individual students include: a school code, the city where the test was taken, the semester (either 
A, which is from February to November, or B, which runs from September to June), the type of 
secondary school that the individual attended (mainly academic or technical), if the school is 
public or private and the location of the school within the city.
8  All ICFES data used in this 
analysis are for 2003. 
 
Unfortunately, ICFES data on individual characteristics are limited.  Presumably, fixed effects 
by location can capture some of the socio-economic characteristics of the individuals living in 
the area.  In fact, the data identified nine localities in the city that are quite homogeneous in 
terms of income.  In contrast, the information on the schools from the Ministry of Education is 
very rich, and I will exploit this as the source of variation in order to estimate the impacts. 
 
In conclusion, in order to estimate the direct effect of the concession schools, this analysis uses 
the 2003 school and test score data.  The panel data at the school level for 1999 and 2003 are 
used to estimate the indirect effect. 
 
  b. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents data of the full sample of basic characteristics of public schools, divided into 
concession (close to 1,050 individuals in 17 schools) and non-concession schools (36,000 
individuals in 2,790 schools).  Eligibility requirements preclude the use of data on private 
schools, which may downplay the competition argument, though only slightly since there is still 
competition for resources among public schools.   
  
                                                 
8 The data identifies nine main geographical areas (subdivisions of location of the school in the north, south, west 
and east parts of the city).   15
The distribution of locations is quite similar between the two groups.  The majority of the 
schools are co-ed.  In terms of the type of secondary school, the majority of concession schools 
provide a classic academic education, whereas 30 percent of the public schools provide technical 
education.  The distribution of schedules across public and concession schools is quite different: 
concession schools use complete schedules, whereas public schools are divided between 
morning, afternoon and evening schedules.  Even though there are differences in the two groups, 
the estimators presented below balance the two samples  of students  in terms of observable 
characteristics. This is very important since the estimators have to isolate the effect of 
concessions from differences in other variables. For example, new literature on the length of 
school day and the quality of education shows a positive relationship between the two (Cerdan 
and Vermeersch, 1996).   
 
On average, public schools tend to be bigger than concession schools.  The number of students in 
grades lower than their age group (“overage”) is lower in concession schools than in the rest of 
public schools.  The teacher-student ratio is quite similar (close to 28 students per teacher), as is 
the average years of education of teachers (16 years). 
 
The table also shows data on the two main impact variables, dropout rates and test scores. 
Dropout rates, measured by grade for grades 1 through 11, differ between the two types of 
schools.  The dropout rate is 18 percent in regular public schools (with a standard deviation of 
0.14), and 15 percent in concession schools (with a standard deviation of 0.09). 
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Table 1. Basic statistics (public schools) 
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
A. CHARACTERISTICS 
Localization 
1  0.10  0.30  0.12 0.33
2  0.01  0.10  0.00 0.00
3  0.05  0.22  0.00 0.00
4  0.06  0.24  0.00 0.00
5  0.15  0.36  0.12 0.32
6  0.04  0.19  0.00 0.00
7  0.30  0.46  0.44 0.50
8  0.12  0.32  0.13 0.34
9  0.17  0.38  0.19 0.40
Type of school 
              Male  0.07  0.26  0.00 0.00
              Female  0.03  0.16  0.00 0.00
              Coed  0.90  0.30  1.00 0.00
Type of secondary 
            Academic  0.63  0.48  0.93 0.26
            Technical  0.29  0.45  0.00 0.00
            Both  0.07  0.26  0.07 0.26
Schedule 
            Complete  0.03  0.18  1.00 0.00
            Morning  0.40  0.49  0.00 0.00
            Afternoon  0.14  0.35  0.00 0.00
            Evening  0.43  0.49  0.00 0.00
Number of students 
     Total school  2954.60  1376.76 987.98 90.17
     Taking exam  122.15  79.16 65.33 9.98
     In overage  47.28  45.15 12.11 7.03
     Repeating grade  103.30  73.72 47.56 35.93
    Ratio teacher/stud.  28.44  6.20  27.20 3.48
Years of education, 
teachers 
16.07  2.28  16.02 0.99
B. OUTCOMES 
Dropout rates 
         Grade 1  0.040  0.05  0.020 0.02
         Grade 2  0.031  0.04  0.023 0.02
         Grade 3  0.026  0.04  0.019 0.02
         Grade 4  0.026  0.03  0.015 0.02
         Grade 5  0.020  0.33  0.018 0.02
         Grade 6  0.071  0.09  0.021 0.02
         Grade 7  0.040  0.04  0,025 0.02
         Grade 8  0.038  0.04  0.032 0.03
         Grade 9  0.039  0.05  0.036 0.03
         Grade 10  0.033  0.04  0.038 0.04
         Grade 11  0.012  0.02  0.021 0.05
Test scores 
          Mathematics  42.08  5.13  41.68 4.77
          Reading  50.99  7.13  51.04 6.79
Number of observations 
      Students 
         Max  36244  1056
         Min  34218  1013
      Schools  2790  17
Non-concession Concession  17
Graph 1 shows the dropout rate per grade.  The dropout rates in concession schools are lower and 
exhibit smooth behavior across grades.  In contrast, public schools mimic the behavior of the 
dropout rates found in others datasets using national statistics (for example, Barrera and 
Dominguez 2005), in which there is a significant increase in the dropout rate in the transition 
between grades five and six (last year of primary and first year of secondary).    
 
Graph 1. Drop-out rates, concessions versus non-concessions  
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Interestingly, dropout rates for concession schools increase significantly in grade 8.  This may 
indicate a change in the composition of students in secondary education in the concession 
schools.  Since attending a concession school reduces the dropout rates for grade 6, more 
students, including those who would have dropped out in the regular public system, are reaching 
higher grades.  The population of students in secondary education in the concession schools 
includes those in the lower part of the income distribution, who have a higher probability of 
dropping out of school.  
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Graph 2 presents mean standardized test scores for private, regular public and concession 
schools.  It shows that there are no clear differences between regular public schools and 
concession schools, whereas there exist substantial differences between all public and privates 
schools.  However, concession schools deliver higher mean test scores than similar public ones 
after controlling by observable characteristics. 
 
Graph 2. Mean test scores  
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Graph 3 presents mean test scores against the standard deviation of the scores by school type.  
There is evidence of a positive relationship between mean test score and dispersion.  The graph 
also shows that public schools are more homogeneous (as measured by dispersion) than private 
schools.     
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Graph 3. Mean test scores against standard deviation 
 
 
Table 2 presents basic statistics for the public schools within a kilometer of a concession school, 
as well as public schools outside the influence of concessions. 
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Table 2. Basic statistics, schools near concession versus far away schools
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOLS 
1. "Before concessions" (1999)  Mean  Std.dev Mean Std.dev
Infrastructure 
   Number of computers  17.82  16.75 24.96 22.69
   Number of classrooms  21.40  10.58 22.24 12.93
   Number of bathrooms  1.45  0.78 1.67 0.87
   Number of sport facilities  1.78  0.54 2.59 1.52
Teachers 
   Number of teachers  30.27  16.34 34.46 24.06
   Number of admin. pers.  6.97  4.45 9.69 11.96
   Number of physicians  0.06  0.24 0.45 1.10
   Number of psychologists, etc  1.52  1.29 2.19 1.85
   % teachers with second. educ  0.07  0.18 0.06 0.12
   % teachers with college educ  0.60  0.23 0.60 0.62
   % teachers with graduat. educ  0.25  0.17 0.34 0.34
   Ration students / teachers  24.92  3.24 26.16 28.78
Drop-out rates 0.09  0.07 0.07 0.06
2. “After concessions” (2003) 
Localization 
1  0.00  0.05 0.10 0.30
2  0.00  0.00 0.01 0.10
3  0.00  0.00 0.05 0.22
4  0.04  0.19 0.06 0.24
5  0.20  0.40 0.15 0.36
6  0.00  0.00 0.04 0.19
7  0.15  0.36 0.30 0.46
8  0.45  0.50 0.12 0.32
9  0.16  0.37 0.17 0.38
Type of school 
              Male  0.00  0.00 0.07 0.26
              Female  0.00  0.00 0.03 0.16
              Coed  1.00  0.00 0.90 0.30
Type of secondary 
            Academic  0.80  0.40 0.63 0.48
            Technical  0.06  0.24 0.29 0.45
            Both 0.14  0.35 0.07 0.26
Schedule 
            Complete  0.04  0.20 0.03 0.18
            Morning  0.28  0.45 0.40 0.49
            Afternoon 0.07  0.25 0.14 0.35
            Evening  0.61  0.49 0.43 0.49
Number of students 
           Total school  2544.18  786.25 2954.60 1376.76
           Taking exam  136.97  69.02 122.15 79.16
           In overage  35.52  35.30 47.28 45.15
           Repeating grade  114.93  88.69 103.30 73.72
           Ratio teacher/stud.  31.42  2.56 28.44 6.20
Year of education, teachers  16.49  0.73 16.07 2.28
Drop-out rates
         Grade 1  0.035  0.04 0.040 0.05
         Grade 2  0.030  0.03 0.031 0.04
         Grade 3  0.030  0.03 0.026 0.04
         Grade 4  0.018  0.02 0.026 0.03
         Grade 5  0.021  0.02 0.020 0.33
         Grade 6  0.054  0.06 0.071 0.09
         Grade 7  0.029  0.03 0.040 0.04
         Grade 8  0.051  0.04 0.038 0.04
         Grade 9  0.046  0.03 0.039 0.05
         Grade 10  0.040  0.03 0.033 0.04
         Grade 11  0.012  0.02 0.012 0.02
Number of schools  23  416
Schools near a concession Schools far away from   21
In 1999, regular public schools near concession schools had, on average, fewer resources than 
other public schools.  For instance, the number of computers in schools near concession schools 
was only 17, whereas it was 25 in schools in other parts of the city.  Also, the absolute numbers 
of teachers, administrative personnel, physicians and psychologists were lower in regular public 
schools near concession schools.  The educational attainment of teachers in 1999, measured as 
the proportion of teachers with secondary studies to those with college or graduate studies, was 
very similar across the two school types.  Finally, regular public schools near concession schools 
had, on average, 24 students per teacher, compared to 26 students per teacher in the rest of the 
public system.  In sum, there is evidence that regular public schools near concession schools 
were smaller and poorer than the rest of the public system, although the quality of the teachers 
was similar.  Given that concession schools are located in low-income areas, these differences 
are not surprising and it is likely that any result based on an unmatched sample will be biased. 
 
In 2003, in general, the regular public schools near concession schools were similar to the rest of 
the public schools, with some exceptions.  The proportion of secondary schools with an 
academic focus was higher in nearby schools than in public schools further away.   Also, a 
higher percentage of the nearby schools used the evening schedule (0.61 versus 0.43, 
respectively).  Furthermore, the nearby schools have lower overage ratios.  
 
Regular public schools near concession schools tended to have lower rates than other public 
schools in 2003.  The dropout rate increases from 2.1 percent in grade 5 to 5.1 percent in grade 6, 
whereas the dropout rate for other public schools rises from 2 percent in grade 5 to 7.1 percent in 
grade 6.  However, the dropout rates in regular public schools near concession schools tend to be 
higher than the ones in the rest of public schools at higher grade levels.  Again, these results are 
based on the unmatched samples and thus the controls may not be a good counterfactual. 
 
c. Results 
 
Estimates of Equation (2), the average treatment impact on the treated, are presented below.  
There are several different estimators, ranging from the nearest neighbor to kernel estimators, 
that can be used to determine the counterfactual.  In this paper the estimation is based on the 10   22
nearest neighbors matching estimator, with a caliper of 0.01; that is, the counterfactual is made 
of only those observations with a propensity score within 0.01 of the propensity score of the 
treated observation.  All variables outside the common support were excluded (see Vinha 2005).  
This analysis also checks the robustness of the estimation.  As a first approximation, results for 
the dropout rate are quite stable and independent of the type of estimator; on the contrary, the 
results for the impact on test scores vary with the type of estimation.  
 
The results for the direct and indirect effects are presented in Table 3. The first two columns 
present the results from the estimation of Equation (3) for concession schools, whereas columns 
three and four present the results for the indirect impact on nearby regular public schools.  The 
estimation uses data at the school and grade level. 
 
In general, the coefficients of the probit estimation to determine the propensity scores are the 
move in the expected direction for both types of impacts.  I test for the balance of characteristics 
across treated and control schools.  The groups are balanced in all variables except two (number 
of students and proportion of students in grades lower than their age).  In order to improve the 
balance in the two samples, I omit observations with the extreme propensity scores from the 
analysis. In any case, one variable remains unbalanced. 
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Table 3. Direct and indirect impact of concessions: effects on dropout rates
Probit estimates 
Dependent variable 
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Total number of students  -0.008 0.001 * -0.015 0.003  *
Dispersion in the test  -0.366 0.080 * -0.708 0.178  *
Localization 4  13.472 8.162  *
Localization 5  0.024 0.168   9.129 8.556   
Localization 7  0.212 0.138   13.929 8.089  *
Localization 8  -0.052 0.163   12.411 8.234   
Localization 9  0.048 0.155   12.455 8.311   
Schedule Night  -0.243 0.173   1.966 0.430  *
Ration teacher / stud.  -0.284 0.046 * 0.514 0.094  *
Average year of educ. teac.  -0.035 0.025   0.080 0.079   
% of students repeating  -1.723 0.351 * 1.407 0.502  *
% of students in overage  3.327 0.719 * 5.040 1.709  *
Number of computers, 1999  0.027 0.020   
Number of class rooms, 1999  0.053 0.038   
Number of restrooms, 1999 -4.686 0.719  *
Number of sport facilities, 1999  -1.723 0.260  *
Number of teachers, 1999  -0.476 0.278  *
Number of administrative p. 1999  0.202 0.050  *
Number of psychologist, 1999  -0.069 0.187   
Ration teacher / stud., 1999  0.059 0.038   
% teachers with second., 1999  35.714 10.066  *
% teachers with college, 1999  33.968 9.841  *
% teachers with grad. st., 1999  25.912 8.898  *
Log likelihood  -529 -231
PseudoR2  0.1391 0.5714
Number of obs.  2334 1217
Matching 
Variable: Dropout rate 
Difference Treatment-Control 
Unmatched  -0.0130 -0.0069
ATT -0.0173 -0.0082
Bootstrap statistics 
Repetitions  1000 1000
Standard error  0.0039 0.0096317
Bias-corrected conf. Inter.  -0.0244 -0.0112 -0.0341 0.0004 
Impact variable: Dropout rate Impact variable: Dropout rate 
Direct impact on dropout rates
Concession
Indirect impact on dropout rates
Schools near concession   24
The lower part of Table 3 presents the impact of the program on dropout rates.  The results show 
that concession schools have lower dropout rates (with a difference of 1.7 points) than similar 
public schools.  Given the range of dropout rates (between 1.2 percent and 7.1 percent), this is an 
important and large effect.  In order to find the standard error for the estimator, a bootstrap 
procedure was performed with 1000 repetitions.  The effect is statistically different from zero at 
the 90 percent level of significance. 
 
Columns three and four present evidence of the indirect impact.  That is, the probit is run with a 
dependent variable that equals one for regular public schools near concession schools and zero 
for public schools outside the influence of concessions.  Again, in general, the probit estimates 
move in the expected direction and several of them are statistically significant.  The estimated 
indirect impact of concession schools on nearby public school dropout rates is a reduction of 
0.008 points.  However, the standard error for the estimator (using a bootstrap procedure with 
1000 repetitions) indicates that the 90 percent confidence interval is between  -0.03 and 0.0004.   
Thus, I cannot rule out that there was no impact. 
   
Table 4 presents estimations of the direct impact of concession schools on the standardized test 
scores in mathematics and reading.  The data are at the individual level.  As in the previous 
regressions, the majority of the coefficients of the independent variables in the probit estimation 
move in the expected direction, and several of them are statistically significant, with one caveat: 
in contrast to the previous estimation, there are several variables that are not balanced in the 
treatment and control individuals (results are not show).  To address this, I reduce the range of 
propensity scores in which the matching is performed, with some improvements on the balance 
of the samples.  The implication is, again, that the treatment impact is for those individuals 
within this range of propensity scores and not for the whole population.  The results hold for both 
estimations (math and reading). 
 
The calculated impact is positive and statistically significant for both reading and mathematics 
test scores.  Mathematics scores for concession schools are almost one point higher than similar 
regular public schools and the effect is significantly different from zero.  The impact on reading 
scores for concession schools is higher, with an estimated impact of almost 2 points.  Given that   25
the average scores are 42.08 and 50.99, the results imply improvements of 2.4 percent and 4 
percent, respectively. 
 
Table 4. Direct impact of concessions: effects on test scores (mathematics and reading)
Probit estimates 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Total number of students  -0.018  0.001 * -0.018 0.001  *
Dispersion in the test  -0.351  0.033 * -0.197 0.029  *
Localization 5  -0.441  0.079 * -0.542 0.080  *
Localization 7  0.149  0.063 * 0.140 0.064  *
Localization 8  0.073  0.075   0.079 0.076   
Localization 9  -0.150  0.071 * -0.181 0.072  *
Evening sche.   0.102  0.072   0.068 0.073   
Ration teacher / stud.  -0.071  0.005 * -0.072 0.005  *
Average year of educ. teac. -0.089  0.012 * -0.095 0.011  *
% of students repeating  -2.508  0.183 * -2.575 0.179  *
% of students in overage  19.165  0.779 * 18.789 0.774  *
Constant  4.683  0.300 * 4.474 0.330  *
Log likelihood  2152.87  -2846.556
Pseudo R2  0.2768  0.268
Number of obs.  18629  18630
Matching 
Variable: Test scores 
Difference Treatment-Control 
Unmatched  -0.2099  0.6234
ATT  0.9732  1.9364
Bootstrap statistics 
Repetitions  100  100
Standard error  0.522  0.748
Bias-corrected conf. interv.  1.2684  1.4655 1.5501 2.8472 
Impact variable: Mathematics Impact variable: reading 
Direct impact on math tests Direct impact on reading tests   26
It is important to note that a simple comparison between concession schools and other public 
schools shows that concession school have, on average, lower math tests. Indeed, the unmatched 
impact is -0.2099. However, once the estimation controls for the observable characteristics, the 
impact of concession on the score is positive and significant. 
 
Lastly, Graph 4 presents the relationship between test scores and dropout rates.  In theory, better 
quality of education induces, in the short run, reduced desertion.  Students who stay in school are 
more motivated and study more, which is likely to lead to higher test scores in the future.  The 
graph presents long-term evidence of this assumption.  Presumably, concession schools will have 
a larger impact on test scores the longer that students stay in the program. 
 
Graph 4. Relationship between mean test scores and dropout rates  
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5.  Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, there is strong evidence of a direct impact of concession schools in reducing 
dropout rates.  There is also some evidence of an indirect impact of the concession schools on the 
dropout rates in nearby regular public schools.  Furthermore, there is evidence of a positive 
impact on test scores of students in concession schools when compared with students in other 
public schools. 
 
Moreover, as discussed previously, there is some evidence of downward bias in the estimations. 
Indeed, OLS estimators are lower than the matching estimators. This finding strengthens one 
important idea of the paper: given that propensity and matching estimators correct only partially 
the sources of bias, presumably the effects of concessions are larger than the ones presented here.   
 
The results for dropout rates are especially important in light of the current situation in the 
country.  The enrollment rate in secondary education in the cities is reaching levels of 85 percent 
but the dropout rates are higher in the transition from primary to secondary education.     
Concession schools seem to be a promising intervention for reducing desertion from schools at 
this critical juncture.  However, as public investment in each concession school is around $2.5 
million, it is important to perform a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
The test score results are also promising, especially considering that they are just the initial 
impacts.  The concession schools program started in 1999, four years before the test score data 
were collected.  Individuals who took the exam were in grade 11, and therefore, they most likely 
transferred into the concession schools in grade 8.  Presumably, the impact on individuals who 
start in a concession school from grade 1 onward will be higher.  
 
Instruments for improving the quality of education are limited.  In fact, the educational sector in 
Colombia, and most likely in several other countries, is subject to inflexible policies adopted in 
the past under different conditions. Concession schools are an option that may be able to 
generate consensus as a positive measure. However, the potential scale of any such program may 
be limited.  The program relies on private, high quality schools to manage public schools.     28
Clearly, there are only a limited number of such schools and, of those, even fewer may 
participate in the program.    29
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